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Antitrust and California's New Preferred Provider
Organization Legislation: A New Alternative in
Health Care Cost Containment
The July, 1983 amendment to California Insurance Code section 10133 al-
lowed private health insurers to contract with a closed panel of hospitals
and doctors for negotiated rates. This opened the way for the proliferation
of Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO's), the newest alternative to
traditional medical practice. Although PPO's will inject the much needed
element of competition into the medical profession, thereby halting escalat-
ing health costs, antitrust concerns must be considered. The author exam-
ines various PPO structures and activities which invite antitrust litigation
while suggesting methods by which a PPO may minimize antitrust
liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to contain the spiraling cost of health care services,1
the California Legislature, in June, 1982, passed an amendment to
California Insurance Code section 10133.2 This amendment,
1. In 1960, the nation spent less than $26 billion on health care. By the end of
1983, health care reached $363 billion (14 times the cost in 1962). In California's
largest urban centers, health care costs have risen nearly 200% since 1972, while
the state's consumer price index over this same period rose only 140%. Paris,
Shock! Terror! Invisible Hand Strikes California Doctors, FORBES, Nov. 7, 1983, at
38.
The culprits responsible for these unacceptably high costs are the providers of
health care and the patient-consumer. Medical doctors in office-based practice de-
rive approximately two-thirds of their income from third-party payors. Owens,
How Much of Your Money Comes From Third Parties?, MED. ECON., Apr. 4, 1983, at
254.
Physicians and hospitals in providing services are generally not cost conscious
inasmuch as they are not financially responsible for the services. Working on a
fee-for-service basis, the doctor makes decisions as to diagnosis, treatment, return
visits, tests, drugs, the need for and place of hospitalization, procedures to be
used, and the need for referral. Doctors have no incentive to implement equally
effective but less costly alternatives. Melia, Aucoin, Duhl & Kurokasa, Competition
in the Health-Care Marketplace: A Beginning in California, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED.
788, 789-90 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Melia] Weller, Antitrust and Health Care:
Provider Controlled Health Plans and the Maricopa Decision, 8 Am. J.L. & MED.
223, 225 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Weller].
Similarly, consumers of health care are generally indifferent to medical care
costs. Since insurance companies pay most bills for the vast majority of patients,
the patient has no incentive to seek out equally effective but less costly alterna-
tives. Id.
2. See Act of June 30, 1982, ch. 329, § 8, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2326, 2331-32
(West).
which became effective on July 1, 1983,3 opened the way for pri-
vate health insurers to contract with a closed exclusive panel of
hospitals and doctors for negotiated rates. 4 Consequently, Califor-
nia is the vanguard of a revolution in health care delivery which
has not seen such a fundamental change since private health care
began in the 1930's.5
This recently enacted legislation has triggered a phenomenal
growth of Preferred Provider Organizations (hereinafter PPO's)
in California.6 Preferred Provider Organizations are being touted
as the most effective way yet invented to put a lid on health care
costs, including health insurance premiums which have been ris-
ing 25% to 40% per year.7 To be sure, all eyes are on California.
Other states and the federal government will monitor PPO's care-
fully. If selective contracting works, the rest of the country will
join the PPO bandwagon.
Although California's cost-containment mentality in the area of
health care is extremely favorable to the proliferation and success
of PPO's,8 there is a major obstacle. The biggest issue looming on
the PPO horizon is antitrust litigation.
The purpose of this comment is to provide basic familiarity with
3. Passage of this amendment added to California Insurance Code section
10133 the following-
(b) [A]n insurer may negotiate and enter into contracts for alternative
rates of payment with institutional providers, and offer the benefit of such
alternative rates to insureds who select such providers.
(c) Alternatively, insurers may, by agreement with group policy holders,
limit payments under a policy to services secured by insureds from insti-
tutional providers, and after July 1, 1983, from professional providers,
charging alternative rates pursuant to contract with such insurer.
CAL. INS. CODE § 10133 (West Supp. 1983).
4. Id.
5. Along with the passage of the amendment to the California Insurance
Code, which involves the private sector, two other pieces of legislation dealing
with state and federal reimbursement to providers constitute the revolution re-
ferred to above. These other two pieces of legislation involve the public sector.
In March, 1983, Congress passed the Social Security Act of 1983, which included
the most significant Medicare reform to be enacted since Medicare's inception. In
June, 1982, the Governor of California also signed A.B. 799 which altered Medi-Cal
reimbursement to providers. California Contracting System, CAL. BROKER, Sept.
1983, at 12-13; Melia, supra note 1, at 789.
6. As of July 2, 1983, California had 57 PPO's and 165 organizations that
claimed to be a PPO or a variation on the theme. 4 NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 2,
1983, at 1.
The explosive growth of PPO's appears to be occurring in large metropolitan cit-
ies having a surplus of physicians and rapidly growing HMO's, which are presuma-
bly taking patients away from other providers. Hunt, Preferred Provider
Organizations.: The Latest in the Commercialization of Medicine, PRrv. PRAc., Nov.
1982, at 15, 20.
7. See Paris, supra note 1, at 39.
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Waldholz, Discount
Medicine: To Attract Patients, Doctors and Hospitals Cut Prices to Groups, Wall St.
J., Nov. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
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PPO's, to examine the important antitrust issues involved, to sug-
gest how PPO's can minimize antitrust risks, and to conclude
with a statement on the impact and future of PPO's: Is this the
best method to achieve cost-containment in the delivery of health
care services?
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is a Preferred Provider Organization?
Preferred Provider Organizations have existed for many years.9
However, it was not until recently that they have experienced
rapid growthlO and have been labeled as the trend of the future."
The PPO concept is different from a Health Maintenance Or-
ganization (HMO)12 or an Independent Practice Association
(IPA).13 The fundamental distinction is that HMO's and IPA's in-
volve provider risk,14 whereas in a PPO, the risk is not borne by
the provider but by the payor.15
Inasmuch as there are many variations of the PPO concept,' 6
9. Lewis, Preferred Provider Organizations-A Developing Concept in Health
Delivery, SOCIOECONOmC REP., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 3-4. Prototype PPO's have ex-
isted for many years in the form of union health plans' "dual choice" programs. In
their early days, these plans originated from the payor's desire to contain costs by
steering members to specified discount providers. In contrast, today's PPO's have
developed from provider concern over rising competition. Providers are seeking
methods to protect their own piece of the patient pie which each year is sliced
thinner as the number of competing providers increases. Id. at 4.
10. See supra note 6.
11. See A new cure for health-cost fever, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 1982, at 117; Berger,
Selective Contracting: California's Hot Potato?, Hosp. F., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 7; Hunt,
supra note 6, at 15.
12. An HMO takes the form of the traditional "closed panel" health organiza-
tion. It provides health care at a central facility and employs providers at fixed
salaries. Provider membership is limited, hence the "closed panel" designation.
The patient-enrollee does not pay a deductible, and generally there is no out-of-
pocket payment for treatment. See Weller, supra note 1, at 227-28. See also 42
U.S.C. § 300e(a)-(c) (1982) for a detailed discussion of HMO's under the Federal
Health Maintenance Act.
13. An IPA, a hybrid HMO, provides services at the offices of its providers and
reimburses the providers on a fee-for-service basis, up to an amount agreed upon
by the provider members of the IPA. Not all IPA's are "health plans" but are tra-
ditionally "open panel"-open to all interested providers in the area. Weller,
supra note 1, at 227-28.
14. See Lewis, supra note 9, at 3.
15. Id.
16. While there are many PPO variations, there are generally three types of
PPO's. The provider-based PPO is organized by a hospital or physician. "For ex-
ample, a local hospital could develop a network of other local hospitals and then
there is no standard definition of a PPO. However, although the
term is generic and used to describe a wide variety of arrange-
ments, there are certain features which are characteristic of all
PPO's:
(1) "A PPO is essentially an agreement between a third-party
payor and a provider for the provision and reimbursement of
services.'17
(2) A typical PPO consists of a designated panel of health care
professionals or institutions which comprise the "preferred
provider" panel.18
(3) The PPO has contracted with the third-party payor to pro-
vide health care services on a traditional fee-for-service basis
at a discounted price in exchange for payment within a des-
ignated time.19
market this network of hospital services to employers or insurance companies
(both payors for health care services)." Enders, The Preferred Provider Organiza-
tion-Pro-Competitive Alternative or Antitrust Problem?, HosP. F., Nov.-Dec. 1982,
at 42.
The second type of PPO is purchaser-based as it is organized by an employer,
insurance company or other third-party payor for health care services. Id.
Under this type of PPO, the benefits coordinator of the payor would usu-
ally take the lead in obtaining the participation of a sufficient number and
type of hospitals and professionals to satisfy the anticipated patient load
that the payor provides (e.g., employees of the self-insured employer, sub-
scribers to an insurance plan, etc.).
Id.
The third type of PPO is entrepreneur-based. An individual or business entity,
who is not a provider of health care services, puts together a number of providers
to render services at a reduced cost. Id.
The entrepreneur, in turn, markets this cost-saving health care delivery
system to large buyers of health care services (e.g., self-insured employers
or insurance companies). Alternatively, the entrepreneur could proceed
by exploring the interest of large buyer(s) of health care services to par-
ticipate in a discount delivery system if the entrepreneur can obtain suffi-
cient quantity and type of providers to service (at a discount price) the
projected patient load. To an extent, this entrepreneur is like a broker-
matching buyers with sellers of health care services on terms favorable to
both. In a sense, this entrepreneur is finding or making a market for his
PPO.
Id.
17. See supra note 9.
18. "Some PPO's include only primary care physicians, while others have a
comprehensive geographic and specialty network of doctors, hospitals, pharma-
cies, and diagnostic facilities." O'Connor, Preferred Provider Organizations: A
Market Approach to Health Care Competition, Hosp. F., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 16.
19. "Most PPO's reimburse physicians at 10 to 20 percent below 'usual and
customary' charges." Id. Accord Katz, Preferred provider organizations: New re-
lation of the HMO, POST GRAD. MED., June, 1983, at 143; Zannoth, PPO 'Newest Kid
on the Block' in Health Care Delivery Systems, 81 MICH. MED. 627 (1982). "Provid-
ers can justify reduced rates because the PPO promises rapid claims payment and
reduced administrative costs." O'Connor, supra note 18, at 16-17. The payor has an
incentive to ensure fast payment since the payor's cost will be held down as long
as the provider is encouraged to participate by the promise of rapid claims pay-
ment. Lewis, supra note 9, at 3.
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(4) The PPO is guaranteed a defined pool of patients,20 who are
not locked into a specific panel of health care providers,21
but have an economic incentive to utilize a PPO provider
member.22
(5) A PPO commonly includes "a program of utilization review
(UR)23 and a management information system which pro-
vides cost and use data for employers and trust funds."24
B. Antitrust and the Professions
Since the unanimous landmark decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,25 the United States Supreme Court has held that the
activities of professionals (including lawyers,26 engineers, 27 hospi-
tal administrators, 28 and physicians 29 ) are subject to scrutiny
under the federal antitrust laws.30 Additionally, the Court has ex-
20. This patient pool usually consists of employees (and their dependents)
whose employers participate in a PPO type of health plan. Lewis, supra note 9, at
2. The fact that a provider is guaranteed "a patient pool safe from raiding by, or
wandering off to, non-member providers" gives the provider an incentive to pro-
vide a discount. Id. See also supra note 19.
21. "Patients are not restricted to one clinic or physician; they have free
choice among providers whenever care is needed." O'Connor, supra note 18, at 16.
A patient may either select a provider from a list of PPO providers or may select a
non-member provider. Zannoth, supra note 19, at 627.
22. Built-in incentives, such as eliminated co-payments and/or increased ben-
efits give patients nearly 100% coverage when they choose providers who partici-
pate in the plan. Typically, only 80% of health care costs are covered when a non-
member provider is selected. O'Connor, supra note 18, at 16.
23. These systems range from a cursory claims check, little more than a
paper chase, to fairly sophisticated data collection and concurrent review
systems. Some have physician peer-review committees that review ambu-
latory and ancillary services as well as inpatient utilization. Because PPO
providers are not at risk for the cost of care as they are in HMOs, analysis
of utilization patterns is an important cost-control mechanism. UR is the
plans' assurance that care is given in an appropriate, but cost-effective
manner, and that providers do not merely increase the number of services
to make up for a discount.
Id. at 17. See also Perler, Utilization Review for the PPO, Hosp. F., Nov.-Dec. 1982,
at 23 (detailing the ingredients of a practical plan for concurrent review).
24. Lewis, supra note 9, at 2.
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (fixing legal fees).
26. Id.
27. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(agreements to avoid competitive bidding).
28. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (interfering
with expansion project).
29. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (setting of
maximum fee agreements by physicians).
30. 421 U.S. at 787. ('"he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not
provide a sanctuary from the Sherman Act.") See also Note, The Antitrust Liabil-
pressly determined that third-party agreements between insur-
ance companies and pharmacists to furnish prescription drugs to
insured policy holders at controlled costs, are not exempt from
the antitrust regulations as being part of "the business of insur-
ance." 31 Even though the judiciary has had little antitrust experi-
ence in the health care industry,32 health care providers may be
subject to the same rules of antitrust liability which apply to
other industries. 33
C. Antitrust Fundamentals
The heart of antitrust analysis is section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
* . . is ... illegal."34 While "[t]his section, if read literally, would
prohibit most if not all commercial contracts, since all agreements
could be said, in some manner, to restrain trade . .. [t his was
not the intent of Congress. Congress and the courts have con-
curred in limiting section 1 only to unreasonable restraints of
trade."3 5 To determine whether a certain business practice con-
stitutes a restraint of trade36 under the Sherman Act, two basic
ity of Professional Associations After Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned Profes-
sions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1047; Kauper, Antitrust and
the Professions: An Overview, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 163 (1983) (general discussions of
antitrust and professions as a whole).
31. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 220 (1979)
(setting forth three criteria for determining whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976) provides an exemption from antitrust laws).
32. 457 U.S. at 349. See generally Weller, The Primacy of Standard Antitrust
Analysis in Health Care, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1983) (history of antitrust
enforcement in the health care industry from 1939 to present).
33. See 457 U.S. at 349.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958), the Supreme Court set forth the purpose of the Sherman Act stating:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as rule
of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while
at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions .... [Tihe policy un-
equivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Id. at 4. See also Blake, Bork, Bowman & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dia-
logue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965).
35. Heitler, Health Care and Antitrust, 14 U. To.. L. REV. 577, 581 (1983) (foot-
note omitted).
36. Where antitrust is concerned, there is no precise definition for the term
"restraint of trade." "[It] is a legal term of art, deriving its meaning from the cur-
rent decisions and constructions making up the particular body of law in which it
appears .... [N]othing less than the whole body of case-law constitutes the defi-
nition of 'restraint of trade."' A.D. NEALE & D.G. GOYDER, THE ANTrrRuST LAWS OF
THE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA 22 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NEALE].
[Vol. 12: 121, 1984] Antitrust and California PPO Legislation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
doctrines are utilized: the per se rule and the rule of reason.37
1. Per Se Doctrine
The per se doctrine, which is an evidentiary rule, tests whether
price-fixing has occurred.38 Inasmuch as price is the "central ner-
vous system of the economy," 39 the defendants' activities consti-
tute a per se violation of the Sherman Act "if their purpose is to
fix prices or if their conduct, should it achieve its goal, will be to
affect market price."40 The per se doctrine applies to practices
which experience has shown "are so 'plainly anticompetitive,'...
and so often 'lack ... any redeeming virtue,' . . . that they are
conclusively presumed illegal without further examination [as to
whether they might or might not be reasonable in a particular
case]. ' 41 "Such arrangements, often called 'naked restraints' on
price, cannot be justified."42 This harsh rule against price-fixing
agreements is based upon the principle that these pernicious
agreements "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. '43
2. Rule of Reason Doctrine
The second standard, which can also be utilized to determine
whether price-fixing has occurred, is known as the rule of reason
doctrine. 44 It is a rule of construction. 45 The rule of reason test
requires an inquiry into the purpose of the restraint, its probable
37. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fix-
ing and Market Division, 74 YALE LJ. 775 (1965); L SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRuST §§ 63-72, at 165-97 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SuLLrvAN]; NEALE,
supra note 36, at 23-32.
38. NEALE, supra note 36, at 30.
39. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
40. SuLLrvAN, supra note 37, § 70, at 192.
41. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979).
42. SuLLIvAN, supra note 37, § 74, at 198. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am.
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets).
43. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951), overruled on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). For a discussion of Copperweld, see infra notes 90-100 and
accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the rule of reason, see generally SuLLrvAN, supra note
37, §§ 63-66, at 165-82; NEALE, supra note 36, at 23-30.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
or actual effect, and any benefits unique to the arrangement
which may outweigh any negative impact on competition. 46 The
rule of reason is directed towards "winnowing out the restraints
which are merely ancillary or incidental to competition,47 or
which do not affect competition to a significant degree. ... 48 In
short, the analysis turns on whether the procompetitive benefits
outweigh the anticompetitive harms.49
III. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES TO PREFERRED
PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
Although much of the literature on the subject of PPO's50 has
hailed the concept as an innovative and cost-reducing alternative
to existing delivery systems5 ' which will introduce competition
into the medical marketplace, 52 it is far from clear that a PPO is
the pro-competitive vehicle that its proponents claim it to be.53
How the PPO is structured and functions has a strong impact on
the creation of antitrust litigation risks. Among the most fre-
quently litigated activities in the medical profession are price-fix-
ing by practitioners and boycotts.
A. Price-Fixing
Under California Insurance Code section 10133, groups of prov-
iders or individual providers may enter into contracts with private
third-party payors.54 Since individual providers are often at a bar-
gaining disadvantage, many such providers are now forming
46. See Note, Antitrust Law-Maximum Prices and the Per Se Rule-Should
Law Be Divorced From Economic Realities?-Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soci-
ety, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), 56 TEMP. L.Q. 162 (1983); see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
47. For example:
The owner of a small ... retail business may wish to sell it and move to
another district. The goodwill he has built up is a valuable asset of the
business which a would-be buyer expects to have to pay for and hopes to
profit by. If the seller . . .were immediately to set up in another shop
next door, the buyer would [be] swindled. It is common in such [a case]
for the contract of sale to include a restrictive covenant by which the
seller binds himself not to compete against the buyer [for a certain period
of time].
NEALE, supra note 36, at 26.
Restraints of this type are legitimate under the rule of reason inasmuch as the
restriction involved is subordinate to the main and legitimate purpose of protect-
ing the buyer. Id.
48. NEALE, supra note 36, at 29-30.
49. SuLLrvAN, supra note 37, § 72, at 195-96.
50. See supra note 11; O'Connor, supra note 18, Paris, supra note 1.
51. Enders, supra note 16, at 42.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 3.
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PPO's or becoming members of PPO's. The PPO acts as a broker
and negotiates contracts with third-party payors. 55 While such ac-
tivity is clearly authorized by section 10133, the method of deter-
mining what fees a PPO will charge for certain procedures may
make a PPO the target of litigation over alleged price-fixing56
violations.
1. Price-Fixing Agreements Between Preferred Provider
Organizations
Price-fixing agreements are firmly ensconced in antitrust
prohibitions.5 7 In many instances, the line between legal and ille-
gal fee arrangements may be extremely fine. For example, agree-
ments between independent PPO's to fix a common price for
various health care services violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act.5 8 Such practices clearly constitute "naked restraints" and
would therefore be illegal per se.59 However, it would not be ille-
gal for individual PPO's to be aware of the fact that other PPO's
are receiving substantially similar fee reimbursement
schedules. 60
2. Price-Fixing by Physicians
Sinister antitrust implications arise when physicians agree as a
group on an acceptable fee arrangement. In Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,61 which has been widely touted as a
55. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 18-19.
56. The classic definition of the term "price-fixing" refers to any contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy "formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce ..... " United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940).
"[N Iot all contracts that have an effect upon price are properly considered price-
fixing agreements. Obviously, where a buyer and seller agree upon a price, there
is no violation. . . ." Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors:
Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 645, 656.
57. See generally SuLLvAN, supra note 37, pt. d, §§ 73-78, at 197-212; NEALE,
supra note 36, at 36-57; R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLicY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 263-79 (1978).
58. See NEALE, supra note 36, at 36.
59. See generally United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)
(leading case on price-fixing).
60. See, e.g., Kallstrom, supra note 56, at 679.
61. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
weathervane of antitrust analysis in the health care industry,62
the Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of maximum fee set-
ting by physicians who were members of two medical founda-
tions. In compiling its fee schedule, the Board of Trustees of each
foundation would solicit advice from various medical societies
about the setting of fees.63 The Board would formulate a new fee
schedule which limited the amount that a doctor could recover for
services performed on patients insured under plans approved by
the foundations. 64 It would then submit the schedule to the en-
tire physician membership for majority approval. 65 While revi-
sions occurred periodically,66 the parties agreed that 85% to 95%
of the doctors in Maricopa County charged at or above the maxi-
mum fee levels allowed by the foundation.67
The Court held that the maximum fee 68 agreements constituted
horizontal 69 price-fixing agreements by the physicians under the
per se rule,7 0 thereby violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.71 In
spite of this ruling, the impact of the Maricopa decision "does not
make every ... contract [which fixes price] per se illegal."72
62. See Fried, The Impact of Recent Antitrust Case Law on Health Care Profes-
sionals, 10 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, 254, 255 (1982).
63. 457 U.S. at 340-41.
64. Id. at 341. If an insured visited a non-member doctor, coverage would be
limited to the maximum allowance in the Foundation's schedule. Id. Similarly,
member doctors were free to treat non-participating patients at fees higher than
those permitted in the schedule. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at n.10.
68. Cf Note, supra note 46, at 181-83 (wherein the author posits that agree-
ments establishing maximum prices have the inherent potential to benefit con-
sumers by forcing economic efficiency).
69. A "horizontal agreement" is "an agreement among entrepreneurs in direct
competition with each other." E. KINTER, AN ANTrrRUST PRIMER 42 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as KIrrER]. Compare vertical price-fixing agreements which are
agreements between two entrepreneurs who would normally not be in "direct
competition with each other, nor would they generally be operating at the same
levels in the economy." Id. at 43.
70. But see Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8-10, wherein the Court held the per
se rule should not be applied until the Court gains enough experience with a spe-
cific practice to know that it is unduly anticompetitive. Accord White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
71. 457 U.S. at 357.
In this case the rule is violated by a price restraint that tends to provide
the same economic rewards to all practitioners regardless of their skill,
their experience, their training, or their willingness to employ innovative
and difficult procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also may dis-
courage entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new
developments by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquerade for
an agreement to fix uniform prices, or it may in the future take on that
character.
Id. at 348.
72. Fried, supra note 62.
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"Professionals 'fix prices' all the time. One need only look to
medical group practices or even law firms for examples of 'price-
fixing' by professionals which do not violate the law. 7 3 Consider-
ing Justice Stevens' observation in the Court's opinion-"[ejven
if a fee schedule is ... desirable, it is not necessary that the doc-
tors do the price-flxing"74-- the Maricopa decision appears to be
limited to those instances of overt price-fixing by physicians.7 5
While separate provider entities may not legally agree to set
fees, they may combine to form joint ventures76 or parent-wholly-
owned subsidiaries. 7 7 In Maricopa, Justice Stevens indicated that
if the providers had combined and formed a joint venture, the de-
fendants would have escaped antitrust violations under the per se
rule.78 "Joint ventures ... enhance competition by creating new
efficiencies or new productive capacity not achievable by the sep-
arate entities"'79 and thus are subject to antitrust analysis under
the rule of reason.80 "The threshold requirements for escaping
per se treatment are that the offending activity be only literal, not
effective price fixing, and that the price-fixing or any other re-
73. Id.
74. 457 U.S. at 352 (footnote omitted).
75. See supra note 72. (The author states Maricopa will be narrowly restricted
to its facts and will not have a significant impact on practice in the health care in-
dustry). Compare Cohen & Tiano, The Aftermath of Maricopa, 10 LAW, MED., &
HEALTH CARE 248 (1982) (wherein the authors conclude that Maricopa will have a
broad application in the health care industry).
76. "Joint venture" is defined as "[a]n association of persons jointly undertak-
ing some commercial enterprise. It requires a community of interest in the per-
formance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in
connection therewith, and duty. . . to share both in profit and losses." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979).
It should be noted that the joint venture concept is, by its own nature, unclear.
In the words of one commentator, it is "a vague and protean concept" potentially
applicable to "all situations in which two or more persons or independent firms
join forces to achieve some common goal." Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the An-
titrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1007 (1969).
77. The typical parent-subsidiary structure is formed when one entity has
working control through stock ownership of another entity, the subsidiary corpora-
tion.
The power to control appears to be the most important criterion used to deter-
mine single entity status as other criteria break down and become irrelevant in
complex antitrust litigation. Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97
HARV. L. REV. 451, 464-70 (1983).
78. 457 U.S. at 356-57.
79. Weller, supra note 1, at 234-35.
80. Id. at 235.
straint be a necessary part of the joint venture."81
In order to qualify as a joint venture, there are several prelimi-
nary requirements which must be met: (1) a combined entity
must be formed in order to permit either (a) entry into the mar-
ket of a new product, service, or technology not otherwise avail-
able from individual members, 82 or (b) entry of joint venturers
who would otherwise be unlikely to enter the market in the ab-
sence of the risk-spreading aspects of the joint venture; 83 (2) the
members, who would otherwise be competitors, must pool their
capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for
profit; 84 and (3) the combined entity (either collectively or indi-
vidually) must not have substantial market power so as to ex-
clude competitors from the market or affect market prices. 85
In assessing antitrust implications under the less repressive
rule of reason analysis, the Court in United States v. Penn-Olin86
set forth comprehensive guidelines which trial courts might take
into account in assessing the anti-competitive effects of a joint
venture.87 In summary, "Itihe joint venture Rule of Reason ap-
proach is predicated on the existence of some degree of integra-
tion."8 8 If the joint venturers allege that the venture is integrated,
when in fact the joint venture is being used as a camouflage for
81. Id. (footnote omitted). In other words, the restraint is ancillary to the pur-
pose of the joint venture. See also Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 1 (price-fixing was
considered "a necessary consequence" of the joint venture).
82. See Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1523,
1525-26 (1982).
83. Id. at 1526.
84. 457 U.S. at 356.
85. See R. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 117-18 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as POSNER].
86. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
87. [T~he number and power of the competitors in the relevant market;
the background of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the rela-
tionship of their lines of commerce; the competition existing between
them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other;
the setting in which the joint venture was created; the reasons and neces-
sities for its existence; the joint venture's line of commerce and the rela-
tionship thereof to that of its parents; the adaptability of its line of
commerce to non-competitive practices; the potential power of the joint
venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in
the relevant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had en-
tered it alone instead of through [the joint venture]; the effect, in the
event of this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential competi-
tion; and such other factors as might indicate potential risk to competition
in the relevant market. In weighing these factors the court should remem-
ber that the mandate of the Congress is in terms of the probability of a
lessening of substantial competition, not in terms of tangible present
restraint.
Id. at 176-77.
88. Kopit & Klothen, Antitrust Implications of the Activities of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247, 269 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Kopit].
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concerted activity, the joint venture rule of reason approach
"pierces the veil" and holds the venture illegal.89
In addition to the joint venture approach suggested in Mari-
copa, the more recent case of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.90 signaled to the health care industry that PPO's may
also form legitimate parent-wholly-owned subsidiary relation-
ships9l to escape section 1 Sherman Act violations.
In Copperweld, Independence Tube Corporation ified a section
1 Sherman Act suit against Regal Tube Company, its wholly-
owned subsidiary, and Yoder Company, another tubing company.
Yoder Company was subsequently exonerated from any antitrust
liability, leaving the parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary as the sole parties to the section 1 Sherman Act conspir-
acy.92 On appeal from the court of appeals, 93 the issue before the
Court was whether a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary are legally capable of conspiring with each other under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.94
The Court noted that section 1 of the Sherman Act "reaches un-
reasonable restraints of trade effected by a 'contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy' between separate entities," 95 and that a parent
and its wholly-owned corporate subunit invariably exist as one
and "always have a 'unity of purpose or a common design.' "96
89. Id.
90. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
91. See supra note 77. The parent-wholly-owned subsidiary relationship is not
to be confused with the company practice of conducting its business through
branches, divisions, or departments. The latter business arrangement does not or-
dinarily give rise to antitrust challenges. Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences
of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968).
92. 104 S. Ct. at 2733.
93. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2740. The Court's analysis was limited to wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries and did not address "under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be
liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own." Id.
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 2733 (emphasis in original).
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of inter-
est. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate
actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate conscious-
nesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a
vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal
"agreement," the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole
shareholder. If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a
course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that
Repudiating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,97 the Court
held that "Copperweld [a parent] and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary [Regal] are incapable of conspiring with each other for the
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act."98
Although the Court found the unilateral activities of a parent
and its wholly-owned subsidiary to be incongruent with the sepa-
rate entity requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act, Cop-
perweld plainly indicates mere formulation of a parent-wholly-
owned subsidiary structure does not give rise to carte blanche ex-
emption from section 1 conspiracies. While the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine can no longer be used as a basis for a section
1 conspiracy, a conspiracy will exist under the rule of reason anal-
ysis99 if either the parent or its wholly-owned subsidiary attempts
to restrain the competitive ability of outsiders or controls the sub-
sidiary by stock acquisition specifically calculated to effectuate re-
strictive practices.100
3. Exchanges of Price Information
In instances where pernicious price-fixing is absent, concerted
action to fix prices may exist where a particular industry engages
in "activities" which are in themselves legitimate but may also be
used to disguise or facilitate collusion.' 0 ' For example, a PPO
may exchange fee or cost information among competing provider
had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for
§ 1 scrutiny.
Id. at 2742.
97. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "provides that § 1 [Sherman Act]
liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its subsidiary are subject to
common ownership." Id. at 2736.
Few defendants are actually found liable solely on the basis of in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine, but the availability of that doctrine in-
duces unsuccessful suits that would not otherwise occur, complicates and
lengthens independently meritorious suits, confuses judges and juries,
and sometimes leads to condemnation-without justification in antitrust
policy--of unilateral behavior.
Areeda, supra note 77, at 451.
For cases in which the Court utilized the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy
to find a section 1 Sherman Act conspiracy, see generally Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). To
the extent that the holding in each case was supported by the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine, Copperweld has disapproved and overruled those portions.
However, in each case there was at least one alternative basis for finding an anti-
trust violation by the defendant. Thus, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
was not necessary for a finding of substantive liability.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
99. Areeda, supra note 77, at 471.
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2738-39.
101. See NEAL., supra note 36, at 43-57; see also PosNEa, supra note 85, at 135-67.
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groups or promulgate recommended fee schedules. This ex-
change of information is a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
reciprocal exchanges of price information appear to be wholly le-
gitimate inasmuch as a businessman has a right to be well-in-
formed about market conditions.10 2 After all, the economic theory
of competition does not require decisions to be made in the
dark.l0 3 But, on the other hand, it is clear that these activities
may be used to facilitate collusion between companies. 04 The
circulation of information regarding fees creates the opportunity
to apply pressure on a firm to set prices which are compatible
with the rest of the industry without explicitly asking others to do
S0.105 This exchange of price information through fee schedules
may be construed to amount to a "tacit invitation" to follow a con-
certed pricing course if the invitation was uniformly acted
upon. 0 6
A decision that collusive price-fixing exists, rather than a legiti-
mate exchange of information about business conditions, requires
a showing that an apparent uniformity of prices results from col-
lusion, not from conditions in the market. 0 7
In this context collusion means a real "meeting of the minds" in a com-
mon endeavour to suppress or limit price competition; moreover, it is im-
plied that the plan or understanding can be relied on with reasonable
confidence by the participants. The individual firm, in other words, must
be under some fairly effective inhibition as regards "breaking the price
line" when the temptation to do so appears strong. Conversely, when the
members of a trade group are genuinely left free in their pricing decisions
and do in practice exercise their own discretion, collusion cannot be in-
ferred and no antitrust offense can be established.10 8
There is no doubt that reciprocal exchanges of price informa-
tion, coupled with uniformity and inflexibility of prices, invite law
enforcement officials to suspect concealed price-fixing. 0 9 Since
"[t] he inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price infor-
mation has. . . an anticompetitive effect in the industry,"" 0 these
102. NEALE, supra note 36, at 44.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See POSNER, supra note 85, at 146.
106. See Kallstrom, supra note 56, at 679.
107. NEALE, supra note 36, at 50-51.
108. Id. at 51. Accord POSNER, supra note 85, at 145.
109. See supra note 102.
110. See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (Seller upon
request by a competitor furnished information regarding recent prices charged or
quoted to customers with the expectation of reciprocity. This exchange of infor-
mation stabilized prices and was held illegal per se.). See also United States v.
tactics should be avoided at all costs.
4. Physician Control of Preferred Provider Organizations
The Federal Trade Commission has deemed physician control
of prepayment plans another major area of antitrust concern."1 1
Since many PPO's are established by physicians, who view it as
an opportunity to retain their share of the patient market, the
board of directors may consist of a number of practicing physi-
cians. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has
found no antitrust objections when fee schedules are set by orga-
nizations not controlled by professionals."12 In view of this state-
ment, it appears that providers may serve on the board of
directors as long as they do not comprise a majority of the board.
In the event that providers do make up a majority of the board,
antitrust sensitivities arise inasmuch as one of the functions of
the board of directors is to determine fees. Fee setting by boards
comprised of a majority of doctors could be construed as allowing
doctors to decide what to pay themselves, 1 3 a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.14
However, while physicians are prohibited from controlling
health care organizations, antitrust implications are vitiated
where a majority of doctors on the board of directors are not ac-
tively practicing physicians.115
By the same token, risk of antitrust liability could also be cre-
ated if the providers make up a majority of the payor's board of
directors.1 6 In such cases, it is easily inferred that the providers
are controlling the insurer. "[TIhe nature of the agreement be-
tween insurers and providers changes from an ordinary two-party
contract ... [to a horizontal agreement] because the insurer be-
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (involving other sophisticated and well-super-
vised plans for the exchange of price data among competitors).
111. See, e.g., Heitler, supra note 35, at 606-07.
112. Kopit, supra note 88, at 264. The Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
found no antitrust implications where a proposed prepaid legal plan organization
would be governed by a board of directors consisting of a majority of non-lawyers.
The program did not contemplate inviting any bar association to approve or en-
dorse a particular fee schedule, and attorneys would act only in an advisor capac-
ity on what the usual and customary fees are in a particular geographic area. Id.
at n.70.
113. See, e.g., Lynk, Regulatory Control of the Membership of Corporate Boards
of Directors: The Blue Shield Case, 24 J.L. & ECON. 159, 173 (1981).
114. See Kopit, supra note 88, at 262-64.
115. FrC Advisory Opinion: Health Care Management Associates, June 7, 1983,
at 1.
116. Note, Limiting Provider Participation in Health Insurer Reimbursement
Decisions: An Antitrust Cure for a Crisis in Medical Care Costs, 72 GEO. L.J. 161,
175 (1983).
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comes the agent of the providers who control it."n7 If this type of
concerted action occurs, and prices of health care services are af-
fected, serious price-fixing implications arise." 8
B. Concerted Refusals to Deal
1. Limitations and Restraints on Providers or Third-Party
Payors
Antitrust litigation is likely to arise where a PPO acts in a con-
certed"a9 fashion to boycott 120 a particular program or entity.' 2 1
When PPO's join together for the sole purpose of expressing dis-
satisfaction with the maximum reimbursement rate set by insur-
ers and collectively threaten to cancel their contracts, concerted
action clearly exists.122 Additionally, concerted action arises
when groups refuse to complete forms in an effort to influence re-
imbursement, or participate in insurance programs only on terms
deemed acceptable by the groups.' 23 In these types of situations,
117. Id. at 173.
118. Id. See also Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of Calif., 544 F. Supp.
230, 237 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affid per curiam, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1016 (1982) (wherein the court stated that the "most troublesome" opportu-
nity for restraint of trade exists when pharmacies control insurance companies);
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (court found a conspiracy among doc-
tors in a Blue Shield plan which required in its by-laws that a majority of its board
of directors be physicians); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 517 F. Supp. 564
(D. Minn. 1981) (fourteen members of a twenty-one member board of directors
were required to be participating dentists in a pre-paid dental plan); Nurse Mid-
wifery Assocs. v. Hibbet, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,040 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(United States District Court found a conspiracy where physicians controlled a
medical malpractice insurance plan); but see Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Mich., 555 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984) (provider minority control of an insurer may
amount to a conspiracy if there is evidence that the minority provider actually
controlled the insurer's reimbursement system).
119. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600, 614 (1914), noting the difference between unilateral and concerted action: "An
act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when done by many
acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of conspiracy." See also United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). A unilateral refusal to deal without
more and "[i] n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" is,
generally speaking, lawful under the Sherman Act. Id. at 307.
120. See generally SuLxvAN, supra note 37, at 229-65 for a discussion of
boycotts.
121. See KItmR, supra note 69, at 37.
122. See Heitler, supra note 35, at 593.
123. See, e.g., Michigan State Medical Soc'y, No. 9129 (F.T.C. Feb. 17, 1983).
the provider groups are using the third-party payor as a vehicle
by which to effectuate a price-fixing conspiracy. Such types of
group boycotts have in some situations been found illegal per
se.12
4
Another type of boycott arises when groups of providers seek to
impose unreasonable restraints on a competing group of provid-
ers or on an individual provider.125 For example, PPO's should
not enter into any agreements which limit another provider's abil-
ity to participate in or be compensated by other programs.126 In
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia,127 the court found a boycott existed in defendant's refusal
to pay fees for psychotherapy unless such treatment was super-
vised by and billed through a physician. 28 The requisite contract,
conspiracy, or combination was founded on the fact that Blue
Shield was in effect a combination of physicians, operating under
the direction and control of its physician members.129 These phy-
sicians were held to have acted jointly through Blue Shield to
protect themselves from the competition of the clinical
psychologists. 3 0
Similarly, PPO's should refrain from limiting or prohibiting par-
ticipating providers from contracting with or participating in the
programs of other PPO's or other third-party payors.' 3 1 Third-
party payors should also remain free to contract with other
PPO's.132
124. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). But see AN-
TrTRUST ADVISOR § 1.32, at 62 (2d ed. Supp. 1983) (although such concerted action
would appear to be a "naked restraint" of trade under the per se analysis, "[t]here
has been an almost universal refusal to apply the per se rule to 'boycotts' in [the
medical profession] ").
Rather, the courts have preferred to utilize the rule of reason doctrine when
boycotts are involved. However, in spite of this:
It does not by any means follow automatically that an arrangement will be
legal just because it is not illegal per se. ... [T]he question of the nature
of the inquiry to be conducted under the rule of reason still remains....
[T]he important question is not the impact of the refusal to deal in the
welfare of the excluded [group], but rather the impact of that refusal to
deal on consumer welfare, i.e., on overall economic efficiency.
Id. at 69.
125. See Heitler, supra note 35, at 592.
126. See Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (proof of widespread individual refusals
to deal is not itself adequate to establish the requisite conspiracy; although true
group boycotts to coerce private behavior are illegal per se, unilateral refusals to
deal are permitted).
127. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
128. Id. at 485.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Kopit, supra note 88, at 284-86.
132. Id.
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2. Exclusionary Practices
The exclusion of physicians and other providers from a PPO
creates antitrust sensitivities. 3 3 The classic prescription for im-
proving one's position of power in a market is to limit the number
of participants. 3 4 A PPO may fear that too many practitioners in
a specialty or given area will result in over-utilization, threaten
the economic position of its members, and ultimately, endanger
the competitiveness of the PPo.135 Accordingly, it can be ex-
pected that PPO's will attempt to adopt measures limiting their
provider membership. 3 6 This can be easily accomplished by clos-
ing certain categories of provider membership after a certain
number is reached in a geographic area, or by ousting providers
in those areas of saturation where the problem arises after the
PPO is operational. 3 7
In the above scenario, the excluded providers may have a po-
tential cause of action under the Sherman Act138 based on a con-
certed refusal to deal. 3 9 Although the Supreme Court has
scrutinized boycotts under the per se rule, 140 the lower courts
have preferred to examine the alleged concerted activity under
the rule of reason.1 4 1 The exclusionary practice will pass muster
under the rule of reason doctrine if it can be proved that the prac-
tice has a procompetitive effect which outweighs the anticompeti-
tive consequences.
When the excluding physicians have a rational basis for limiting their
number, such as statistics showing that increasing the number of physi-
cians will increase utilization, none of the crucial components of the [rule
of reason] test will be met. If competition in the relevant market existed,
the anticompetitive intent criterion would be absent and the restraints
would be ancillary to the [group's] organization as a competitor in that
market.142
In addition to a rational basis for the exclusionary rule, the
court may consider the impact of that refusal to deal on customer
133. See generally NEALE, supra note 36, at 58-75; see also supra note 120.
134. NEALE, supra note 36, at 58.
135. See Kopit, supra note 88, at 279.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 279-80.
138. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
139. See Kopit, supra note 88, at 280.
140. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
142. Kopit, supra note 88, at 280. See also Weller, supra note 1, at 243 (author
posits that excluded providers will have an incentive to develop their own health
plans and to compete).
welfare.' 43 The excluding providers would have to objectively
demonstrate that the exclusion was necessary to maintain the in-
tegrity of the PPO or the quality of medical services offered to the
patient pool.'44 For instance, professional incompetence of the
excluded provider(s) would have to be sufficiently demonstrated.
However, exclusion from membership in a PPO cannot revolve
around membership in the local medical society, admission to
hospital staffs, or other external indicia unless those indicia can
be directly attributed to the PPO's competitive posture or to the
PPO's ability to meet its standard of care. 145 "Obviously there is
considerable latitude for creative advocacy in this area. Some ex-
ternal indicia such as medical society membership, would appear
to be unreasonable justifications for exclusions, while others,
such as graduation from an accredited medical school, are less
clear and subject to different interpretations by the courts."'146
In a recent Federal Trade Commission advisory opinion, the
FTC raised no objections to a plan wherein the PPO membership
would not total more than 10% to 15% of all local area providers,
with this participation rate relatively uniform across special-
ties.147 The FTC's posture on this matter is consistent with its be-
lief that PPO's, if structured properly, are likely to be
procompetitive, both by generating competition between cooper-
ating providers and other local providers, and by increasing com-
petition among third-party payors.148
The boycott issue is not limited to membership in the con-
tracting group, 49 and could arise in the context of medical refer-
rals for specialty care.150 Some PPO's are structured so that
enrollees must consult with a primary care provider,' 5' who may
then refer the patient to a specialist within the provider network
if he so desires. 5 2
Arguably, a pattern of election by the primary care providers to
treat a patient's leg, foot, back, or other infirmity rather than mak-
ing referrals to specialty providers within the PPO network (i.e.,
podiatrists, chiropractors, optometrists, endodontists) would ap-
143. See Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp.
1065 (E.D. Pa. 1982), af'd, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
144. See Kopit, supra note 88, at 279-84.
145. Id. at 284.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 115, at 2.
148. See Clanton, The FTC and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 224-25
(1983).
149. See NEALE, supra note 36, at 61-65; Kopit, supra note 88, at 282.
150. Kopit, supra note 88, at 282.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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pear to be a boycott. 5 3 However, in order to establish the requi-
site conspiratorial intent in such cases, more than a normal
pattern of parallel behavior in referrals must be demonstrated.15 4
There must be a showing of other circumstantial evidence point-
ing to conspiratorial intent. Since it is only in rare instances that
documentation of an agreement is uncovered, "collective actions
likely to produce uniform behavior amounting to a boycott" must
be identified. 55 For example, the circulation of certain kinds of in-
formation likely to induce parallel action has been held to war-
rant a finding of a concerted refusal to deal.156 Without more, an
inference of conspiracy would not be permissible if the informa-
tion circulated was otherwise difficult to obtain and had value to
the recipients above and beyond its utility as a signal for con-
certed action.' 57
IV. IMPACT AND FUTURE OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
Preferred Provider Organizations are innovative health pro-
grams designed to cope with the old and complicated problems of
escalating health care costs. However, as with every new concept,
the advantages and disadvantages must be evaluated before any
judgments are made. No doubt, the widespread proliferation of
ppO's,158 in one way or another, has sent a reverberating jolt up
and down the spines of doctors, insurers, employers, and patient-
consumers alike.
A. Impact on Doctors
Not surprisingly, doctors were the group most vocally opposed
to the new law.159 In fact, the opposition of organized medicine
was the major reason the new law was not passed until the 1982
budget crisis in California. 60
There are two reasons for this vehement opposition by doctors.
Philosophically, most doctors do not think that the PPO concept
153. Id. at 282-83.
154. Id. at 283-84.
155. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financ-
ing, 1978 DUKE LJ. 303, 345.
156. Id. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
157. See Havighurst, supra note 155, at 345.
158. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
159. Berger, supra note 11, at 10.
160. Id.
is in the best interest of consumers. Doctors contend that the
same economic rewards will be available to all practitioners re-
gardless of their skill, experience, or willingess to employ difficult
and innovative procedures.161 While selective contracting will
make doctors more cost conscious,162 the American Medical Asso-
ciation is extremely concerned about the potential for medical de-
cisions made on the basis of cost or other professional
judgment.163 "There is always the danger that some avaricious
(or just sloppy) PPO's will win contracts at prices so low that cor-
ners must be cut too finely."164
In reality, these fears may be far less devastating than ex-
pected. For instance, professional conduct may be motivated by
other non-monetary factors such as ethical and public considera-
tion,165 or the threat or fear of malpractice suits.166
Moreover, the problem of the same compensation for less com-
petent or industrious doctors already exists, as it is inherent in
any insurance plan which involves a third-party payor167-be it
Medicare, Medi-Cal, traditional private insurance, HMO's, IPA's,
or PPO's.
Practically speaking, doctors have "little to gain and much to
lose financially and professionally."168 No matter how much time
a doctor contributes toward improving his professional reputation
in the community, his efforts may not be fully realized unless he
is a member of the growing population of PPO's. Many people
161. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
163. See Contracting Alert: Contracting and Professional Liability (California
Med. Ass'n Dep't of Contract Evaluation/Negotiation Services), Dec. 9, 1983, at 1,
which states:
Many procedures and treatments cannot be performed on an inpatient ba-
sis, except with prior authorization. Physicians may be required to com-
ply with peer review decisions, made either by a carrier or by a peer
review organization under contract with the carrier. Obviously, these
"peer review" or cost-containment decisions may affect discharge, availa-
bility of diagnostic procedures or various other conditions which influence
the outcome of patient care. In short, most [PPO] contracts contain provi-
sions which restrict a physician's ability to practice medicine and may
place "cost" concerns over "quality" concerns.
164. Paris, supra note 1, at 39.
165. Comment, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical
Care Crisi, 84 HARv. L. REv. 887, 925-26 (1971).
166. See Contracting Alert, supra note 163, at 1.
Despite the existence of contractual restrictions upon the physician's abil-
ity to treat a patient, there is no provision for a different or lower standard
of care, in terms of obligation to the patient. Applicable standards of care
and medical practice remain unaltered, regardless of the contractual re-
strictions imposed by an insuring arrangement. Therefore, physicians
cannot allow contractual restrictions to change and/or amend their ex-
isting standard of quality care.
167. See Note, supra note 46, at 185-86.
168. See Berger, supra note 11, at 10.
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will gravitate towards a PPO member physician since they are fi-
nancially unable to privately bear the cost of medical care. The
days of the solo practitioner are numbered. Doctors, now more
than ever before, are being forced to join together in groups, real-
izing they face the same fate as the family farm and the corner
grocery store.' 69
The amendment of California Insurance Code section 10133170 is
a strong and coercive device to force practitioners into cost con-
tainment. While no one begrudges physicians a decent living, dis-
counts their long and costly training, or loses sight of the fact that
malpractice insurance fees are exorbitant and office overhead ex-
penses are high, there have been few economic restraints on doc-
tors' fees in recent years. The rapid increase in medical care
costs171 has helped push health care costs out of control and into
the legislature.
B. Impact on Insurers and Employers
In contrast to the physicians, insurance companies and employ-
ers welcome the new amendment as relief from sky-rocketing pre-
miums. Health insurance premiums have climbed nearly 25% for
the nation as a whole. In California, this figure rose to as much as
40%.172 For those employers who offer a PPO plan to their em-
ployees, the savings will be anywhere from 10% to 25%.173 Simi-
larly, health insurance carriers will be in a position to offer lower
rates to their customers.1 74
C. Impact on Patient-Consumer
The impact of California's new selective contracting statute on
patient-consumers is such that the consumer's freedom of choice
has been narrowed and in some cases stripped away.175 With the
exception of the wealthy, the population will face dwindling
choices as to where it will go for health care and how it is
169. Id.
170. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
172. See Paris, supra note 1, at 39.
173. Id.
174. See Paton, Revolution in Health-Care Financing: The Good and Bad of
Preferred-Provider Organizations, Los Angeles Times, May 25, 1983, pt. II, at 7, col.
3.
175. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
treated.17 6 Although, under the PPO concept, the patient has the
choice of either seeing a PPO provider or seeing a non-member
provider, the financial incentive is very coercive. 77
Moreover, not to be forgotten is the question of whether or not
the patient will receive proper medical attention under the new
discount medicine law.'78 Will practitioners, in an effort to avoid
red tape authorization procedures, settle for less effective medical
care?179
V. CONCLUSION
The amendment of California Insurance Code section 10133,
which allows private insurers to contract with a closed exclusive
panel of hospitals and doctors for negotiated rates, is an interest-
ing addition to the health care delivery system and will inject an
element of competition into the health care industry for the first
time. Through careful structuring of PPO's, it is possible to mini-
mize both the breadth and severity of antitrust risks. With care-
ful planning and implementation, the PPO can be a pro-
competitive alternative to traditional medical care. However,
PPO's are not the sole answer to the problem of cost containment
in the health care industry. Rather, a combination of measures by
all sectors of the industry is required. Whether the PPO concept
can contribute to this combination with few adverse effects re-
mains to be seen. PPO's will be monitored with great fascination
by the health care community. All eyes are watching California.
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176. See supra note 159.
177. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 160, 163 and accompanying text.
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